

**SECRET**  
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1948


Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

In response to your memorandum of January 27, 1948, on the subject of an interdepartmental intelligence production program, I agree that procedures for the coordination of intelligence production require refinement and am glad to cooperate in every way possible.

I suggest, however, that the problem of allocating responsibility for production in the scientific and technological fields of intelligence and the formulating of an intelligence production program be first given to the Standing Committee of the IAC. I believe that the scientific and technological fields are at present uncoordinated to an extent which makes them a special case. The initial ground work upon which a determination of intelligence requirements and resources could be made has not yet been completed. It is, therefore, suggested that a special procedure be adopted in those fields, of which an outline is enclosed as Tab "A".

Suggestions relative to the production program and information pertinent to the specific request in paragraph 4 of your memorandum are contained in Tab "B".

Sincerely yours,

  
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington 25, D.C.

State Department review completed

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Encls.: Tabs A and B

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From State Dept:

From Arms Control  
production program

Feb. 10<sup>th</sup>

Allocation of Responsibility for the Production  
of Scientific and Technological Intelligence

For some time there has been felt a need for clarification of responsibilities in the fields of scientific and technological intelligence. The problem was under discussion during the preparation of the NIA and NSC directives, but was treated in general fashion rather than in an attempt to detail responsibilities.

The problem involves both the collection of scientific and technological information in the field and the production, in Washington, of scientific intelligence required by the various departments and agencies. The NSC collection directive which establishes the principles for field coordination of all types of information provides no basic means for tackling the overseas part of the problem. On the other hand, it seems that existing arrangements in Washington do little to give a clear picture of the scientific information available to the government, or of the intelligence research being conducted in scientific and related fields. It appears, therefore, that the next and most urgent task is establishing some machinery for actually collecting information, which must be of a selective and economical character, while simultaneously coordinating the production of scientific intelligence.

The subject is broad and complex and the requirements of the interested departments and agencies differ markedly. The direct interest of the Department of State is perhaps slight, but its intelligence organization has responsibility for certain economic intelligence which derives from scientific and technological matters and is an important, if peripheral, element in scientific intelligence. I refer, for example, to intelligence research in electric power, chemical industries, etc.

The problem might be attacked from three standpoints: (a) to ascertain the work in this field now under way in the various departments and agencies; (b) to seek to categorize scientific and technological intelligence by definition into integral parts; and (c) to assign, by agreement, responsibility for the several segments involved. It is believed that agreement must first be reached on those basic elements of the problem before progress can be made toward ascertaining and meeting the specific requirements of policy makers for finished intelligence in the scientific field. Assignment of direct responsibility will go far towards establishing the means for minimizing duplication and for concerting in the preparation of the scientific intelligence so urgently needed by certain parts of the Federal structure.

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With respect to the specific requirements listed in paragraph 4 of the memorandum of the DCI dated January 27, 1948, the following is submitted:

- 4(a)(b) - The regular intelligence requirements and a sample of the internal production schedules of the Department of State are illustrated in the Monthly Survey of Intelligence Projects, of which copies are regularly conveyed to CIA, and of which a copy is attached.
- 4(c)(1) - Requirements of the Department of State upon other agencies for finished intelligence are filled either by the normal authorized flow of reports from those agencies received through the Special Assistant's Office of Collection and Dissemination (OCD), or through occasional ad hoc requests made to those agencies by the Office of Intelligence Research (OIR). The agreements with other agencies in these matters work satisfactorily.
- 4(c)(2) - Requirements of other agencies upon the Department of State seem to be satisfactorily met in general by regular authorized distribution to those agencies by OIR of reports prepared in that office according to its stated program. Very occasional requests to that Office for ad hoc reports are received and met, satisfactorily, it is believed, under ad hoc agreements over priority and deadlines.
- 4(d) - The requirements of the Department of State are satisfactorily met at the present time in respect to extent of coverage, though depth of coverage is, of course, deficient throughout the intelligence fields of the government.

While the foregoing answers are in quite general terms, this office will be glad to furnish any further information needed in this matter upon clarification of the requirements of the CIA.

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-2-

In respect to paragraph 5 of the memorandum, it is believed that there is need of a correlated plan. Such a plan, however, is bound to be ineffective unless the agencies obtain knowledge of the programs of CIA itself. The Department of State is particularly anxious for such information as a step towards securing for the Department its appropriate share in the production by CIA of reports or parts of reports within the field for which the Department is responsible under NSC No. 3 and thus ending any duplication of effort that may now exist.

It also is believed that economic intelligence presents a particular problem. It is suggested that requirements in that field can be presented usefully only in the light of an agreed set of categories and it is, therefore, recommended that there be prepared a schedule of uniform categories which will enable the agencies to present comparable statements of their requirements.

In reference to paragraph 6 of the subject memorandum, it is suggested that at the earliest opportunity the DCI circulate a statement of the functions of the Public Review Subcommittee as a basis upon which the agencies may begin to prepare their viewpoints for consideration by the IAC.

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